Based on "Farmer-Supermarket Direct-Purchase" as the research background, with farmer, supermarket, logistics company as the main body of research, this paper combines with the thoughts of contract theory, and introduces the concept of fresh-keeping contract of agricultural products. Then, game theory is used to analyze whether to sign the fresh-keeping contract between the supermarket and farmer, supermarket and logistics company. The results indicate that: when farmer and supermarket sign the fresh-keeping contract of fresh agricultural products, the farmer and the supermarket will both benefit from the fresh-keeping contract. Whether supermarket and logistics company sign the fresh-keeping contract is determined by w 1 , w 2 . If w w < , as long as the liquidated damages are in a reasonable range, supermarket and logistics company will both benefit from signing a fresh-keeping contract. This paper can provide a reference for the supermarket, farmers, and logistics companies when signing fresh-keeping contracts.
Introduction
"Farmer-Supermarket Direct-Purchase" is a new form of circulation that farmers sign a contract with merchant, and then the farmers directly provide agricultural products for supermarkets or markets [1] . This mainly wants to build a platform for high-quality agricultural products into the supermarket. Fresh agricultural products are pro-agricultural products to the destination with a certain transportation cost, and in the end, the supermarket sells agricultural products at a certain retail price. Three party's interests are determined by the quality of fresh agricultural products. Therefore, in this paper, based on the results of previous studies, this paper will design the fresh-keeping contract model of fresh agricultural products, and gives the game analysis of whether the farmer, the supermarket and the logistics company sign the fresh-keeping contract or not.
Model Description

Symbol Definition
The symbol definition of the model is shown in Table 1 .
Model Hypothesis
Assuming that the supermarket is risk neutral, farmer and logistics company are risk averse. [ ] ( )
Respectively, on behalf of the profit of farmer, supermarket and logistics company in the case of signing the fresh-keeping contract. H1: Assuming that the supermarket and farmers signed a fresh-keeping contract, the supermarket just buy fresh agricultural products which meet quality requirements, and the fresh agricultural products do not meet the quality requirements will not be purchased.
( ) 1 1 , 1 ρ ρ − represents the probability that the quality of agricultural products is up to the standard or not respectively. H2: If the supermarket and logistics company sign the fresh-keeping contract, the logistics company must ensure the freshness of fresh agricultural products within the scope of supermarket can accepts. If the fresh level of agricultural products cannot be guaranteed, then the logistics company must compensate for a certain amount of liquidated damages.
( )
, 1 ρ ρ − represents the probability whether break the contract or not. H3: If the agricultural products are not fresh enough, consumers have the right to choose whether to buy. Supermarkets will make a price based on the fresh level of agricultural products. The probability that the fresh produce is sold is 3 ρ , the probability of an incomplete sale is ( ) 
Model Establishment
Game Effect Analysis between Supermarket and Farmer
For farmer, "the planting of what", "where to sell", as well as "how much money to sell" is the most concerned problem. For the supermarket, the "quality" and "customer satisfaction" are the most concerned problems. In the case of agricultural products fresh-keeping contract signed, if the supermarket and farmer are consistent, both sides have income, if the supermarket and farmers do not agree, then there is no cooperative relationship between the two sides, then the expected profit is 0. Establish strategic game matrix between supermarkets and farmers as is shown in Table 2 .
In the cultivation of agricultural products, farmers cannot be 100% to ensure that all agricultural products can meet the requirements of the contract, so set the number of agricultural products which meet the requirements of freshness requirements, that can be represented as ( ) 1 3 , j i q γ ε , 3 ε indicates that some of the natural factors that are not resistant to the damage of agricultural products. To make the index of agricultural products meet the requirements is
,
Tq is the total amount of agricultural products production of farmer.
Step 1. Both sides sign the contract ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Step 2. Both sides did not sign the contract ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Step 3. Determination of demand function and basic parameters Table 2 . Game matrix between supermarket and farmer.
Expected profit Sign fresh-keeping contract Do not sign fresh-keeping contract
Sign fresh-keeping contract
Do not sign fresh-keeping contract 0, 0
Consumer demand function
β represents fresh level of fresh agricultural products, consumers will determine whether to purchase or not and the purchase quantity according to the freshness of agricultural products. For farmer, the cost of production of fresh agricultural products is proportional to the degree of efforts of farmers' inputs, the more effort the investment, the higher the cost of production, and the wholesale price will increase accordingly. So the cost of production and wholesale prices are:
For the supermarket, the price of fresh agricultural products is related to the fresh level of agricultural products, the more fresher of agricultural products, the price will be more favorable. The total cost of the purchase of agricultural products is related to the agricultural products' prices and wholesale quantities. The cost of transportation in the fresh contract is related to the efforts of the logistics company to keep the fresh degree of the agricultural products. Therefore, the retail price of fresh agricultural products, wholesale costs and transport costs are: 
The Formula (14) can be simplified as follows:
Similarly, Formula (2) minus Formula (4):
, ,
That is into the Formula (15), can be simplified:
Game Effect Analysis between Supermarket and Logistics Company
Logistics company is mainly responsible for the shipment of fresh agricultural products, and carry out a full range of control of the quality and safety of fresh agricultural products, so that the fresh level of agricultural products can maintain the best. But, at present many logistics companies do not pay great attention to maintain the fresh level agricultural products, a large number of agricultural products will be corruption, wilt and so on when they are shipped to the destination. For such a situation, the supermarket can do nothing, only to try to adjust the prices of agricultural products, so that the agricultural products sold out. But in this way, the profits of the supermarket will be reduced with the loss of the fresh level of agricultural products. So, if the supermarket and logistics company signed the fresh-keeping contract, then the logistics company will pay extra attention to the agricultural products freshness protection. In the transport process, it will use appropriate measures to achieve good preservation of agricultural products. In this way, the freshness of agricultural products can be maintained, supermarkets also need to pay extra cost of preservation. Once the logistics company defaults, it will pay a certain amount of liquidated damages. So, whether sign the contract or not, supermarkets and logistics companies have their own consideration. However, if the parties do not agree on the contract, then the two sides do not cooperate, the expected profit is 0.The game matrix of supermarket and logistics company as is shown in Table 3 .
Step 1. Both sides sign the contract
Step 2. Both sides did not sign the contract
Step3. Game analysis
− , available in (22) and Formula (23): 
From Formula (24) and Formula (25), it can be seen that the expected return of fresh-keeping contract is only related to the total transportation quantities, the effort of fresh-keeping of the logistics company, the probability of default and the default payment, has nothing to do with the agricultural products price and other factors.
Model Results Analysis
Game Result Segmentation
Through the analysis of the game between supermarket and farmer, the supermarket and logistics company, respectively, the expected profit of sign the fresh-keeping contract minus the expected profit of not sign the fresh-keeping contract, the, get the Formulas (15), (17), (24) and Formula (25). The four results will be analyzed respectively.
For Formula (15),
, the i c is the unit cost of agricultural products, c is the average cost of agricultural products, then: (15) is constant greater than 0,that is, the expected profit of signing the fresh-keeping contract is greater than that the expected profit not signing the fresh keeping contract. For Formula (17),
c is per unit transportation cost required by the supermarket. Assume that the supermarket procurement of agricultural products just can be sold, that is supply and demand is equal, then the Formula (17) can simplify as ( ) To sum up, the expected profit margin after simplification is shown as follows:
( ) ( )
Summary of Results
For farmer, because
is constant greater than 0, so there is a dominant position when sign the fishkeeping contract.
For logistics company, For the supermarket, there are two parties to the game, one side is the farmer, the other is the logistics company. From the above, it have been proven that there is an advantage of farmer sign the fresh-keeping contract, so, the farmer will sign the contract and then the supermarket will also sign the contract. The logistics company whether sign the fresh-keeping contract is determined by the size of the liquidated damages. If the supermarket 1 1
As long as the default payment L is in range of this negotiation, the supermarket and logistics companies can benefit from the fresh-keeping contract.
Conclusions
This paper gives the game analysis of fresh-keeping contract between the supermarket and the farmer, the supermarket and the logistics company in the background of farm to market. Supermarket and farmer sign the fresh-keeping contract of fresh agricultural products to ensure the quality of agricultural products produced by farmers. Supermarket and logistics company sign the fresh-keeping contract of fresh agricultural products to ensure that the logistics company maintains the freshness of agricultural products and reduces unnecessary losses in the transport of agricultural products. In the whole analysis of the model, the effort factor maintaining the quality of agricultural products of farmer and logistics company respectively is set, and fresh level parameters are added to make the analysis more rational and logical. In game analysis, with expected profit as evaluation index, this paper discusses the income and expenditure of farmers, logistics companies and supermarkets, lists the expected profit of signing the fresh-keeping contract and not signing the fresh-keeping contract, and then gives the comparative analysis.
The following conclusions can be obtained from the results. First, when farmer and supermarket sign the fresh-keeping contract of fresh agricultural products, the farmer and the supermarket will both benefit from the fresh-keeping contract. Second, whether supermarket and logistics company sign the fresh-keeping contract is determined by 1 w , 2 w . If 1 2 w w = , it doesn't matter whether the supermarket and the logistics company sign the contract, because the profit is equal to the expected profit. If 1 2 w w > , supermarket and logistics company will not choose cooperation. If 1 2 w w < , then there should be a reasonable negotiation of liquidated damages, so the two sides can decide whether to sign a contract, As long as the liquidated damages are in a reasonable range, supermarket and logistics company will both benefit from signing a fresh-keeping contract.
